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Privacy-Preserving Outsourced Media Search
Li Weng, Laurent Amsaleg, and Teddy Furon
Abstract—This work proposes a privacy-protection framework for an important application called outsourced media search. This
scenario involves a data owner, a client, and an untrusted server, where the owner outsources a search service to the server. Due to
lack of trust, the privacy of the client and the owner should be protected. The framework relies on multimedia hashing and symmetric
encryption. It requires involved parties to participate in a privacy-enhancing protocol. Additional processing steps are carried out by the
owner and the client: (i) before outsourcing low-level media features to the server, the owner has to one-way hash them, and partially
encrypt each hash-value; (ii) the client completes the similarity search by re-ranking the most similar candidates received from the
server. One-way hashing and encryption add ambiguity to data and make it difficult for the server to infer contents from database items
and queries, so the privacy of both the owner and the client is enforced. The proposed framework realizes trade-offs among strength
of privacy enforcement, quality of search, and complexity, because the information loss can be tuned during hashing and encryption.
Extensive experiments demonstrate the effectiveness and the flexibility of the framework.
Index Terms—multimedia database, image hashing, indexing, content-based retrieval, data privacy, encryption.
✦
1 INTRODUCTION
M ULTIMEDIA material is nowadays everywhere on In-ternet. It is massively produced, distributed, and 24×7
consumed by users around the globe. As a consequence, the
management of multimedia data, e.g., storage and search,
is typically outsourced to third parties. Outsourcing offers
constant availability, fault tolerance, and gigantic processing
power to both data owners and users. For example, it is needed
when similarity-based searches are performed on extremely
large-scale databases of multimedia content. In practice, out-
sourcing has become a de facto standard for multimedia
repositories, as exemplified by YouTube, Flickr, Picasa, etc.
Outsourcing is however raising potential privacy problems:
i) data owners might involuntarily confide sensitive infor-
mation to third parties; ii) third parties may profile users
according to their queries. Caring for privacy suggests that
user queries should not be fully known by a third party
server, especially when it is not trusted. For example, in a
remote diagnosis application, a patient sends medical images
to a syndrome database for automatic matching. The privacy
concern is that the server should not see the query (which
reveals the patient’s health status) but still perform the search.
This work focuses on a particular application scenario
called outsourced media search. In this scenario, a data owner
outsources the description of its multimedia data to an external
server which provides search service to clients on behalf of the
owner. It is typically suited for cloud storage and computing.
Here, the untrusted server is a threat to the privacy of both
the client and the owner. The challenge is that the server
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must remain capable of performing the search service and
meanwhile know little about the owner’s data and the client’s
interests. This three-party scenario is more difficult than the
conventional two-party scenario. So far most existing solutions
only address the latter, and cannot be easily extended.
In this work, the outsourced scenario is tackled by a novel
privacy-preserving framework based on robust hashing and
partial encryption. In a nutshell, database items and queries
are represented by content-based hash values; the hash value
of each database item is divided into two parts, one of which
is encrypted. The unencrypted part is used by the server for
approximate indexing and search. The encrypted part is used
by the client for refined candidate ranking. Figure 1 shows a
flow chart of the proposal.
Robust hashing is the key element for protecting the privacy
of the owner and the client. Conventional low-level features
sometimes enable the inferring of content [1], while the one-
wayness of hashing makes it hard to recover original content
from hash values. This concept has been successfully used in a
two-party protocol [2]. In order to cope with the new scenario,
another element is incorporated – partial encryption prevents
the server from precisely “linking” queries and database items.
At the server, a high level of ambiguity is maintained because
similarity search can only be performed using unencrypted
hash parts. That ambiguity must be such that similarity search
remains possible and meaningful. Our framework fulfills this
requirement and allows flexible trade-offs among privacy,
search quality, and complexity. To summarize, the framework
has the following desirable properties:
• Scalability: The framework gracefully works with small
to extremely large-scale databases because it is compati-
ble with state-of-the-art multimedia indexing strategies.
• Good retrieval quality: Search precision is dramatically
reduced at the server, but compensated at the client.
Enforcing privacy does not compromise retrieval quality.
• Tunable costs: The framework offers flexible trade-
offs between privacy and computation / communication
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Fig. 1. A flow chart of the proposed solution.
complexity.
• Generality: It is generic and versatile enough to fit
different applications.
In addition to the framework, we introduce the notion of
“privacy gap”, a novel way to quantitatively measure privacy
for retrieval applications. We also define the condition to
achieve the gap, which states that the hash values at the server
must be much shorter than in the conventional scenario.
We demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed frame-
work with synthetic and real datasets containing millions
of items. One main lesson is learnt: it is possible to per-
form efficient privacy-preserving similarity search with high-
dimensional data, which is the key for large-scale applications.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2
is a brief literature review; Section 3 defines the application
scenario, the privacy requirements, and the threat model;
Section 4 gives an overview of the proposed framework, while
Section 5 describes the system in detail; Section 6 shows
experiment results and analysis; Section 7 is about security
and privacy analysis; Section 8 compares our proposal with
some existing approaches; Section 9 concludes the work.
2 RELATED WORK
Privacy-preserving similarity search focuses on the secure
comparison problem: how can values be compared without
revealing them [3]. Existing solutions can roughly be divided
into two categories. The first category includes solutions from
the cryptography community where the problem is considered
as a special case of secure multi-party computation (SMC) [4].
These approaches belong to the area of Signal Processing
in Encrypted Domain (SPEED) [4], [5]. They typically rely
on heavy cryptographic computations, such as homomorphic
encryption [6], oblivious transfer [7], and garbled circuit [8].
SPEED approaches are good at preserving privacy, but they are
very complicated in terms of computation and communication,
thus cannot be used in large-scale applications. They are
generally slow because:
• Homomorphic encryption works with very large number
representations (e.g. 1024 or 2048 bits) and uses many
exponentiation operations;
• It sometimes involves significant interactions between
parties and therefore large payloads of communication;
• SPEED approaches do not offer any trade-off.
Nevertheless, some existing SPEED applications deal with the
search of biometric data [9], such as face recognition [10],
[11], [12] or with multimedia data, such as image search [13].
Scale of their data collections remains small though. An
advantage of SPEED approaches is that they can extend to
more general threat models, in spite of more complexity.
The second category of solutions adopts an entirely dif-
ferent philosophy, namely Search with Reduced Reference
(SRR) [2]. Instead of completely precluding privacy infringe-
ments, they try to make infringements computationally difficult
to achieve. One possible approach is to significantly raise the
ambiguity level of data collection. State-of-the-art solutions
adopting such a paradigm typically enforce the k-anonymity
and/or the l-diversity properties [14]. In the case of multimedia
data, this can be achieved by e.g. quantizing (or compressing)
the low-level descriptions of media items before creating the
database. This lossy process reduces the accuracy of informa-
tion stored in the database, increases collisions in indexing
cells, and creates more ties in distance calculations. In turn,
ambiguity makes it quite tricky to precisely infer knowledge
about database items and queries.
Various contributions have followed this path. A typical
approach to reduce the accuracy of information is randomized
embedding. This dimension reduction approach turns low-level
features into very compact signatures, sometimes called hash
values. A widely used method is the Johnson-Lindenstrauss (J-
L) embedding based on random projections [15], adopted by
Lu et al. [16], Voloshynovskiy et al. [17], and Fanti et al. [18].
Another popular method (including our implementation) is
the locality-sensitive hashing (LSH) [19], which is typically a
quantized J-L embedding. A recently proposed method is the
secure embedding [20], which is a privacy-enhanced variant
of LSH. There are also deterministic ways of generating
signatures. For example, Diephuis et al. use DCT sign bits [21]
and Weng et al. use wavelet sign bits [2].
Existing solutions, whether SPEED or SRR, typically as-
sume a two-party (client, server) scenario. The three-party
scenario has not been addressed yet. The goal of introducing
the server is to significantly reduce the burden of the owner.
It is a challenge to both SPEED and SRR approaches. The
challenge to SPEED is the complication in protocol design
and the potentially increased amount of computation and
interaction. Adding an extra party to a secure protocol is a
drastic change and may completely alter previously established
results. Especially in our case, the added party is an untrusted
one, which further complicates the situation. Technically, it
might be possible to extend a two-party SPEED solution to a
three-party one, but that would inevitably involve the owner
in the interaction, thus defeating the original goal.
SRR approaches can effectively liberate the owner, while
the challenge is to control the amount of information (and
thus computation) at the server. In particular, we require that
the server is not able to infer knowledge from the outsourced
database. This restriction does not exist in previous SRR ap-
proaches, including ours [2]. This is addressed by hashing and
partial encryption. Previously we show that in the two-party
scenario privacy can be achieved without sacrificing retrieval
performance, but at the expense of increased computation at
the server [2]. However, the same trade-off cannot be achieved
in the three-party scenario, because the server has already used
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all available information provided by the owner. Instead, a new
concept named “privacy gap” is introduced.
It may be interesting to contrast our work with secure cloud
search literature, e.g. [22]. Conventionally, secure cloud search
deals with text documents, for which similarity is measured
by keyword matching. Some existing solutions generate sig-
natures, which are different from hash values. The form of the
query is also different - trapdoor information is typically used.
There is no tunable privacy. In addition, our two-stage search
structure is different from the conventional architecture.
3 PRELIMINARY DEFINITIONS
3.1 The Application Scenario
Outsourced media search involves three parties – a data owner,
a client, and a server. The owner possesses raw multimedia
material (images, videos, audio, . . . ), whose goal is to offer
content-based search within its collection, possibly for content
monetization or other profitable purposes. Due to limited
resources, searching is outsourced to the third-party server,
which typically offers better performance than what the owner
could itself provide. After outsourcing, the client sends queries
to the server, which runs searches on behalf of the owner.
Figure 2 illustrates the application scenario.
The main difference between this scenario and the conven-
tional two-party scenario lies in the role of the server – it is
not trusted, thus it can neither directly access the database,
nor analyze the database content; on the other hand, it should
be able to perform search and reduce the load of the owner.
3.2 The Threat Model
In general, privacy involves system properties such as unde-
tectability, unlinkability, and communication content confiden-
tiality [23]. In our scenario, the owner and the client typically
trust each other. In contrast, they do not trust the server, which
is thus the main adversary. Privacy is defined for the client and
the data owner with respect to the untrusted server.
Enforcing privacy of the data owner means preventing the
server from knowing the raw multimedia material [1], or infer
some related knowledge, such as categories of the database
contents (people, nature, indoor/outdoor, . . . , see [24]).
Protocol 1 Privacy-preserving outsourced media search
Parties: Client (C), Server (S), and Owner (O).
Prerequisite: Client and Server register at Owner and share a
secure (encrypted) channel with Owner.
Protocol:
1: C → O : Client requests privacy-preserving search service
from Owner.
2: O → C : Owner sends a token and a decryption key to
Client, along with the query format. All the information
is encrypted.
3: C : Client obtains the token and other information by
decryption, which also authenticates Client’s identity.
4: C → S : Client sends the token and a partial query hash
to Server.
5: S : Server verifies the token and performs a search.
6: S → C : Server sends back the candidate list to Client,
along with distance information and encrypted partial hash
values.
7: C : Client decrypts partial hash values and find the best
match in the candidate list.
Enforcing privacy of the clients refers to preclude the server
from discovering clients’ interest. This concerns not only the
queries of clients, but also the answers from the server. Since
queries and answers share high similarity, spying on one or
the other might breach the privacy of clients.
There are more privacy threats than the ones caused by
this simple query-answer client-server interaction. The server
can further threaten the privacy of clients by profiling and
correlating queries. By observing the queries from one client,
the server might infer some knowledge, such as changes in its
interest. It might also discover that several clients tend to pose
quite similar queries, hence the server might identify groups
of users. This should be precluded as well.
We assume that all parties behave in a curious-but-honest
way. They strictly follow the protocol but they can learn from
the data in their possession for their own purposes.
4 OVERVIEW
This section first gives a global overview of the proposed
privacy-preserving framework, then motivates the need for
robust hashing and encryption. A simple theoretical model is
developed to help with understanding.
4.1 Workflow
The framework for enhancing the privacy of outsourced media
search is composed of the following five steps. The first two
steps are initial preparation. The rest of the steps constitute
the search protocol, which is summarized in Protocol 1.
Preparation at Owner: The owner computes content de-
scriptors from the media data that it owns. Descriptors are one-
way hashed into signatures. Each signature is in part encrypted
and in part left in-the-clear. Signatures are sent to the server.
Indexing at Server: The server indexes in a database the
in-the-clear parts of the received signatures.
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Querying at Client: The client computes a content descrip-
tor from its own query media data. It is one-way hashed into a
signature. Some bits of that signature are sent to the server –
they form a partial query signature. The positions of these bits
correspond to the in-the-clear bits of the signatures generated
by the owner.
Searching at Server: The server runs a similarity search
to identify the signatures that are most similar to the query.
Similarity is computed using the received partial query sig-
nature and the in-the-clear parts of database signatures. Once
identified, the encrypted parts of the most similar signatures
are sent back to the client, along with the distance information
computed at the server.
Refining at Client: The client decrypts the received signa-
tures, and completes the similarity search using the received
distances, the decrypted signatures, and the query signature.
4.2 Rationale behind the Framework
In traditional setups, e.g. Google Image, the server harvests
media contents to create its database, and also receives image
queries from clients. In a context where privacy matters, this
is no longer adequate. With privacy requirements, the server
should have no direct access to the media and that access
should solely be restricted to the owner and/or the client.
Therefore, the low-level descriptions of media items must
be computed at the owner and at the client. But this is not
enough; any direct access to high-dimensional feature vectors
(e.g. GIST [25], SIFT [26], . . . ) describing the media should
be restricted, as recovering the contents from such descriptors
is possible [1]. Content descriptors thus cannot be directly
outsourced to the server as this would potentially compromise
privacy. In contrast, and in order to protect privacy, the owner
and the client must transform content descriptors into one-
way signatures using robust hashing, also called perceptual
hashing [27], [28] or robust fingerprinting [29], [30].
Robust hashing maps multimedia data to compact hash val-
ues. Ideally, a hash value is a short string of equally probable
and independent bits. Robust hash algorithms typically involve
feature transformation, dimension reduction, and quantization.
They enforce the one-way property that it is computationally
difficult to infer the original content from a hash value.
Hashing is a quantization function h(·) which strengthens the
confidentiality of the data: quantization loss hinders the perfect
reconstruction of a vector d from its signature x. Moreover,
function h(·) may also be key-dependent. Furon et al. [31]
propose an embedding where an adversary cannot estimate
h(·) after observing a limited number of pairs (di, h(di)).
On the one hand, with robust hashing, it is impossible to
reconstruct a piece of content from its signature. On the other
hand, similarity searches can reliably use the signatures as a
surrogate for content descriptors because robust hashing results
in similar signatures from similar contents. Searching with
such surrogates is called privacy amplification [17] and has
been utilized to enhance privacy [2], [18].
Despite hashing, the server can infer knowledge of the
database by e.g. clustering the signatures received from the
owner. Even though the server cannot know the nature of
the contents from the signatures, identifying groups of similar
signatures might threaten privacy. To make this task more com-
plicated, way less accurate, and hence better shield privacy,
the owner partially encrypts each signature before outsourcing
them. A signature eventually outsourced to the server therefore
contains an encrypted part as well as an in-the-clear part.
The in-the-clear parts of the signatures are used at the server
when running similarity searches. For these signatures that are
most similar to the partial query signature, the encrypted parts
of their signatures are sent back to the client, along with the
corresponding distances computed at the server and some meta
data. It is up to the client to re-rank the received candidate list
using the distances and the decrypted signatures.
The proposed framework forces the owner and the clients
to be more proactive than in traditional settings that ignore
privacy. Yet, that extra work is small compared to the overhead
of any SPEED-based privacy-preserving approach.
4.3 Theoretical Motivation
A more formal motivation of our approach is presented
here. Assume that a database is composed of N statistically
independent items. An item X is a string of L (binary)
symbols. A query Q is the result of some distortion applied
to one particular item X in the database. Denote I(X;Q) the
mutual information between the symbols of the query and the
item. This quantity theoretically measures how noisy is the
distortion channel X→ Q. It has been proved [32], [33], [34]
that no error-free search is possible if
{∆
def
= I(X;Q)−
1
L
log
2
N} < 0 . (1)
More precisely, whatever the search algorithm, the probabili-
ties of errors (false positives and false negatives) cannot vanish
exponentially as L → +∞ if ∆ < 0. We regard ∆ as a
theoretical quantity measuring how difficult is the search of
the relevant item X in the database of size N .
The key idea of our approach is to split the search into two
rounds: a crude approximate search performed at the server
followed by a refinement of the returned list of candidates at
the client. The search at the server should remain efficient at
scale: it is therefore unfeasible to rely on SPEED solutions. In
contrast, simple values (binary strings, ints, floats) should be
used at the server, facilitating comparisons, distance calcula-
tions, etc. Enforcing privacy, however, suggests that the search
at the server should not be too accurate. Privacy is possible
when the items relevant to a query are “hidden” in a long list
of candidates. Only the client has the ability to re-rank the
candidate list, allowing the truly similar elements to emerge.
Our aim is thus to artificially lower the search quality at the
server but do our best at the refinement stage at the client, i.e.,
the server should operate at a lower ∆ than the client.
There are three ways to enforce a decreased ∆ at the server:
• Increase N : The owner inserts dummy items (a.k.a.
distractors) in the database. We then need a mechanism
to signal dummy items in the list returned to the client.
• Decrease I(X;Q): The client artificially decreases the
mutual information by sending a noisy query Q˜. The
Markov chain X → Q → Q˜ guarantees that I(X; Q˜) <
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I(X;Q). The client uses the true query Q to yield a
reliable refinement.
• Decrease L: This amounts to lowering the length L at
the server while the client uses the full length.
The first option increases the database size, thus is not favor-
able unless the database is too small. The other two options
are similar in the sense that they both add noise, while the
third option essentially adds quantization noise. Our proposal
instantiates the third option by means of partial encryption,
because it is easy to implement.
Next, we estimate the theoretical hash performance after
privacy enhancement, following a similar line as in [35]. When
the Hamming distance is used for hash comparison, two n-bit
hash values are judged as relevant if their distance d is less
than or equal to a threshold t (0 ≤ t ≤ n). The performance
of a hash algorithm can be characterized by the true positive
rate Ptp and the false positive rate Pfp:
• Ptp = Probability {d ≤ t| The two images are relevant};
• Pfp = Probability {d ≤ t| The two images are irrelevant}.
Assuming the n bits are independent and each bit is a binary
classifier with average performance {ptp, pfp}, the perfor-
mance of a general scheme can be formulated as:
Ptp = f(ptp, n, t) (2)
Pfp = f(pfp, n, t) , (3)
where
f(p, n, t) =
n∑
k=n−t
(
n
k
)
· pk · (1− p)n−k . (4)
In our scenario, the decision making is a two-stage process –
first by the server and then by the client. Therefore, the overall
hash performance (at the client) is defined as:
Ptp,client = Ptp,server · Ptp (5)
Pfp,client = Pfp,server · Pfp , (6)
where
Ptp,server = f(ptp, n
′, t′) (7)
Pfp,server = f(pfp, n
′, t′) . (8)
The privacy-preserving protocol essentially influences the sys-
tem performance by Eqn. (5) to (8). In particular, privacy is
achieved by setting n′ << n. The performance also depends
on the indexing strategy at the server: for linear scan, t′ = n′;
for hash table look-up, 0 ≤ t′ < n′.
5 ARCHITECTURE OF THE SYSTEM
This section details the workflow outlined before.
5.1 Preparation at Owner
The content owner has to perform a series of actions before-
hand, off-line, in order to prepare a dataset that will eventually
be outsourced to the server.
First, the owner has to compute content descriptors from the
media data. Such descriptors are typically high-dimensional
vectors. The description d of one multimedia item is then
hashed or quantized into a compact signature x = h(d). A
signature is assumed to be a string of L equally probable
and independent symbols. In the sequel we denote by xi
the signature of the i-th multimedia item. The owner then
processes all its hashed signatures and splits each xi into a
public part xp,i of Lp bits and a secret part xs,i of length
Ls = L − Lp. This latter bit string is encrypted with the
owner’s secret key: si = enc(xs,i). The data eventually
outsourced to the server is the set of pairs {si,xp,i}Ni=1.
5.2 Indexing at Server
The server receives a collection of outsourced signatures from
the owner. As the role of the server is to efficiently perform
similarity searches, it has to index these signatures. The server
is of course free to use whatever high-dimensional indexing
scheme. Indexing schemes based on the traditional inverted
lists using the Bag-of-Words model can be used [36], as
well as other schemes such as LSH [19] or the PQ-Code
approach [37]. The server might also use a simple exhaustive
and sequential search process if the scale is sufficiently small.
The server inserts in its index the parts xp,i of all the
signatures, si being metadata linked to the i-th item.
In our implementation, we consider linear scan and hash
table look-up. The latter is suitable for large-scale cases. It
works as follows. The Lp bits of xp,i are divided into n groups
of smaller sub-strings, each sub-string being of length ℓ where
we assume ℓ = Lp/n. Then we create n hash tables each
having 2ℓ buckets. Each table acts as an inverted index for one
particular group. The buckets of one hash table thus contain
the identifiers of the signatures they are associated with.
5.3 Querying at Client
At query time, a client first computes the content descriptor q
from its query media, and then one-way hashes this descriptor
into a signature y = h(q), which is split into two parts yp and
ys in the same way as the owner did for database signatures.
The string yp forms the querying data sent to the server.
5.4 Searching at Server
The server receives from the client yp which is then used to
probe the index in search for similar contents. Regardless of
the actual indexing and retrieval method, the server eventually
builds a list of candidate signatures from the database that
have been found similar enough to the query, assuming that
meaningful similarity computations are possible between yp
and {xp,i}Ni=1.
In our implementation, a temporary candidate list Lt is
first built according to the particular indexing scheme. For
linear scan, all database items are in Lt. For hash table look-
up, the query yp is split into n sub-strings, each probing
the relevant hash table; the identifiers stored in the matching
buckets are put into Lt. Some variants of this indexing scheme
use more than one matching bucket per hash table: multi-probe
approaches determine the best mp buckets to probe for each
table. Quality of results improve at the cost of extra processing.
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The list Lt is then parsed to retrieve the signatures
{xp,i}i∈Lt and compute Hamming distances:
Dserver,i = dH(xp,i,yp). (9)
The final candidate list L is composed of the indices in Lt
whose Hamming distance is below a threshold. Another option
is to re-rank items in Lt according to their distance Dserver,i
and include in L the indices of the top k smallest distances. In
the end, the server sends back to the client the list of triplets
{i,Dserver,i, si}i∈L.
Since the server evaluates the similarity of the signatures
only with the restricted information xp,i, the candidate list
might contain a number of false positives. It might also fail to
include true positives, because e.g. the indexing method missed
relevant signatures due to the harshly estimated similarity.
5.5 Refining at Client
The client receives the list of candidates from the server. It
then decrypts all the si parts from this list to obtain {xs,i}i∈L
with the secret key shared by the owner. The client has now
access to some extra information about the hash values of the
candidate list, allowing it to refine the results from the server:
Dclient,i = Dserver,i + dH(xs,i,ys) (10)
= dH(xi,y). (11)
This refinement is equivalent to using the full information of
the signatures. Note that the client never knows the complete
hash xi because the server only sends back Dserver,i.
It is then easy to run an exhaustive search on the short list.
It is likely to filter out a large amount of false positives in the
original list L; the false negatives cannot be recovered.
5.6 Discussion
We discuss here several key details that matter for designing
the complete system.
5.6.1 Client–Owner Relationships
Our architecture assumes some cooperation between the client
and the owner. The client adopts not only the same media
description scheme but also the same encryption scheme as
the owner. In a preliminary protocol, the back office of the
owner registers trusted clients and shares the decryption key
via a secure communication channel.
Note that we generally do not consider owner data privacy
at the client, because in many retrieval applications the client
is able to access the owner’s data. The search procedure is just
a step to ease the retrieval. Sending back Dserver is mainly
for efficiency. Since hash values reveal a very small amount of
information about the data, our solution also has the potential
to work with special cases where the owner data is totally
confidential. If a higher privacy level is required, the software
for the refinement procedure can be enhanced by the owner
to further reduce information leak. The goal is to prevent the
client from accessing the hash values during the refinement.
This can be achieved by code obfuscation [38] and/or trusted
computing techniques [39]. In addition, hash values can be
periodically updated to alleviate the problem.
5.6.2 Lengths of Lp and Ls
Recall that the one-way hashed description is a signature x of
L symbols. The signature is subsequently divided into xs and
xp whose respective lengths are Lp and Ls = L− Lp.
Length Lp is a key element setting the trade-off between
privacy and utility at the server. Compared with L, a large
value for Lp (many bits are in-the-clear) enables the server to
determine a high-quality list of candidates, which is likely to
contain most of the true positives and few false positives. But
in this case privacy might be endangered: the server may easily
infer knowledge by clustering the signatures in its database. In
contrast, a small value for Lp might severely alter the quality
of the candidate list – a lot of false positives appear in L.
False negatives are also likely because true neighbors might be
missed more easily. In this case, however, privacy is preserved
as higher-level information is more complicated to infer.
The trade-off between the quality of the candidate list
built at the server and the privacy threats is central to our
architecture. We explore later the impact of the ratio Lp/L in
terms of server’s and client’s retrieval performance.
5.6.3 Candidate List Construction
The size of the candidate list is also a factor impacting the
quality of search. Obviously, regardless of Lp, if the server
returns to the client all the items in the database, then quality
is maximum. But this is not practical. It is costly to send so
much information over the communication channels, and it
triggers heavy computations at the client.
The candidate list L must therefore be short enough to
remain efficient but long enough to include useful candidates
and maintain client privacy. Because hash values are compact,
we can afford much longer candidate lists than in conven-
tional systems. The minimum length depends on the privacy
requirement. This is further discussed in Section 7.2. As said
earlier, the server can either fix a threshold or return the
top k similar elements. We face here the traditional division
between bounding the similarity or bounding the number of
the candidates. In this paper we explore the latter option.
5.6.4 User Management and Quality of Service
The proposed protocol naturally supports multiple clients
(users). Since the privacy threat is the server, only one en-
cryption key is used for the hash database. Legitimate clients
can obtain the decryption key after entity authentication. In
practice, the token based service access can be achieved by
e.g. Kerberos [39]. The owner in fact acts as the authentication
server and the ticket-granting server.
In order to improve quality of service (QoS), it is possi-
ble to encrypt the hash database using multiple keys. Each
key corresponds to a different retrieval/privacy trade-off. The
owner can either provide several copies of partially encrypted
hash databases with different encryption levels, or provide one
copy of partially encrypted hash database with different parts
encrypted by different keys. The client can request a particular
QoS level when asking for a token. The QoS level is flagged in
the token and the corresponding key(s) is inserted. The server
may search in different databases according to the QoS level.
This flexibility facilitates various business models.
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6 EXPERIMENTS
This section gives the experimental results. Two families of
experiments are proposed here. We first present experiments
using synthetic data in order to achieve two goals: (i) thor-
oughly discuss the ability of the framework to enforce privacy
of the owner and the client; (ii) introduce the archetypal shape
of the precision/recall graphs when using the system. We then
use a real dataset comprising 5 million images and show that
privacy can be enforced in reality. We start by describing how
signatures are created at the owner and how ambiguity can be
imposed at the server.
6.1 Generating Signatures
The LSH framework is used in the experiments for generating
the signatures from high-dimensional image descriptors. It is a
well known embedding technique. Specifically, our implemen-
tation is based on Charikar’s algorithm [40]. The embedding
from Rd → {0, 1}L is computed as follows: the j-th bit of
x = h(d) is given by
xj =
{
1 if d⊤ · rj ≥ 0
0 if d⊤ · rj < 0
, (12)
where rj ∈ Rd is a random Gaussian vector. The Hamming
distance between two signatures estimates their angle:
θ(d1,d2) ≈
π
L
.dH(h(d1), h(d2)). (13)
This generates a binary signature of length L for each media
item at the owner. Then, each signature is partially encrypted,
Lp bits remaining in-the-clear and Ls bits being encrypted.
We apply LSH to both synthetic and real data in our
experiments. In particular, LSH is used together with feature
segmentation for real data, which means the feature vector is
first divided into segments and each segment is hashed sepa-
rately. This not only improves the discrimination performance,
but also enhances privacy protection, as shown in Section 7.2.
6.2 Imposing Database Ambiguity
The owner sends the server N signatures, each made of Lp
in-the-clear bits and Ls encrypted bits. Intuitively, the privacy
of the owner is enforced when Lp < ⌊log2(N)⌋. In this case,
the number of bits to encode the clear part of the signature is
small enough to impose ambiguity at the server when creating
the database, i.e., it is guaranteed that several signatures
have identical Lp bits. In contrast, when Lp > ⌈log2(N)⌉,
there might be enough bits to uniquely identify each of the
N signatures by only observing the {xp,i}Ni=1 parts. It is
trivial for the owner to decide the appropriate value for Lp
given N , and the consequences of the imposed ambiguity
at the server are immediate and follow the well-known log
2
rule. For example, if N = 10, 000, 000 then any value for
Lp greater or equal to 24 might raise the risk to give the
server a fair amount of unique xp’s, while values below 23
create confusion. Of course, it is statistically possible that
some ambiguity among the signatures remains at the server
if the owner leaves in-the-clear more than ⌈log
2
(N)⌉ bits, as
observed in the experiments.
6.3 Datasets
6.3.1 Synthetic Data
We first randomly generate 10, 000 vectors of 512 dimensions
using i.i.d Gaussian variables. We then hash each vector and
create 32-bit signatures, i.e. L = 32. These hash values
are used as seeds to create the synthetic dataset. To this
end, 100 modified copies of each seed are created, and the
resulting one million signatures form the data collection of the
owner. Modified copies of seeds are generated by randomly
modifying each 32-bit hash value up to 50%. The owner then
partially encrypts these one million signatures and outsources
them to the server. To evaluate the quality/privacy trade-off, a
ground truth is created by randomly picking 1, 000 seeds and
recording the identifiers of the corresponding 1, 000 × 100
modified signatures. At search time, precision and recall are
computed on the basis of this ground truth, i.e., how many
modified signatures can be found when the client queries the
collection with one seed. Two comments are in order. First, the
seeds are not in the data collection used at search time. Second,
the ground truth is not constructed on the basis of distance
computation, but on the basis of relevance – which signatures
are derived from which seeds. Therefore, by construction,
it is possible for the distance between one seed and one
of its modified signatures to be large since half of the bits
can be changed. It is therefore unlikely that a recall of 1
can be reached at the server when searching its dataset for
signatures that are most similar to queries. Observing the recall
when no encryption is applied thus gives the baseline for the
performance when experimenting with this dataset.
6.3.2 Real Data
We also created a second dataset with real images for a near-
duplicate image search scenario. This real dataset is built upon
the validation set of ILSVRC’12 which consists of 50, 000
original images.1 We expand this image collection by creating
a series of near-duplicates. Specifically, we apply to each
image 15 different families of incidental distortion, each with
7 levels of strength, as detailed in [2, Table III]. Overall, this
results in 5.3 million images. These images are described using
512-dimensional GIST feature vectors [25]. These vectors are
reduced to 256 dimensions using PCA in order to increase
robustness. The owner then hashes the reduced feature vectors.
In particular, feature segmentation is used – each feature vector
is divided into 8 segments; each segment is hashed to produce
16 bits. This results in 128-bit signatures (L = 128), which
are partially encrypted before being outsourced to the server.
The following experiments mainly focus on the encryption
parameters. To evaluate the quality/privacy trade-off, a ground
truth is created by randomly picking 1, 000 original images and
recording the identifiers of the corresponding near-duplicates.
The GIST vectors of these 1, 000 images are computed and
hashed by the client in the same way as the owner, and
partially used as queries. At search time, precision and recall
are computed on the basis of this ground truth, i.e., how
many near-duplicates can be found when the client queries
1. http://www.image-net.org/challenges/LSVRC/2012/
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Fig. 3. Retrieval performance vs. encryption (linear scan).
There is a “privacy gap” between “client” and “server”. The
square marks correspond to top 200 ranks, see Fig. 4-5.
the collection with one original image. This dataset is denoted
as GIST5M.
6.3.3 Performance Metrics
Most experiments produce precision/recall (P-R) curves to
show the quality/privacy trade-off at the server as well as at the
client. The P-R performance at the server is directly related to
the number of bits that are left in the clear by the owner. The
fewer bits, the worse performance at the server. In contrast,
the client has full information once signatures are decrypted,
making re-ranking on distances profitable. Performance at the
client is hence typically much better. All the graphs for the
experiments therefore show pairs of P-R curves, one plotting
the performance at the server, the other at the client. The best
answers at the server and at the client are compared with
the ground truth. The P-R curves are plotted by varying the
number of answers from 5 to 5, 000 with a step of 5. They
are best viewed in color.
6.4 Experiments with Synthetic Data
We conducted a first series of experiments using the synthetic
dataset. Recall that the signatures outsourced to the server are
L = 32 bits long and that the database contains 1, 000, 000
items. We start with the server performing a linear scan of the
data collection. Hash table look-up is discussed later.
6.4.1 Search with Linear Scan
These first experiments aim at understanding the impact of Lp
and Ls. The resulting P-R curves are shown in Fig. 3. We first
set Lp to 32. In this case there is no encryption, allowing to
observe baseline results, which are identical at the server and
at the client. Note that there are enough bits to fully encode
one million signatures. We gradually decrease Lp to 24, 16,
and 8. In these cases, the reduced numbers of in-the-clear bits
start to create ambiguity at the server. With Lp = 8 (75% of
the signature is encrypted), the server is highly confused as
 0
 0.1
 0.2
 0.3
 0.4
 0.5
 0.6
 0.7
 0.8
 0.9
 1
 0  50  100  150  200
p
re
ci
si
o
n
rank
Precision for different levels of encryption -- Synthetic data
Lp=32, server & client
Lp=24,  client
Lp=24,   server
Lp=16, client
Lp=16, server
Lp=8, client
Lp=8, server
Fig. 4. Precision vs. encryption (linear scan). Encryption
decreases precision; “client” always outperforms “server”.
 0
 0.05
 0.1
 0.15
 0.2
 0.25
 0.3
 0.35
 0.4
 0  50  100  150  200
re
ca
ll
rank
Recall for different levels of encryption -- Synthetic data
Lp=32, server & client
Lp=24,  client
Lp=24,   server
Lp=16, client
Lp=16, server
Lp=8, client
Lp=8, server
Fig. 5. Recall vs. encryption (linear scan). Encryption
decreases recall; “client” always outperforms “server”.
 0
 0.005
 0.01
 0.015
 0.02
 0.025
 0.03
 0.035
 0  50  100  150  200
e
st
im
a
te
d
 p
ro
b
a
b
ili
ty
rank
Normalized distribution of relevant candidates -- Synthetic data
Lp=32
Lp=24
Lp=16
Lp=8
Fig. 6. Normalized distribution of candidates among top
ranks at the server (linear scan). Encryption tends to
flatten the distribution.
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON KNOWLEDGE AND DATA ENGINEERING, VOL. X, NO. X, XXX 2016 9
many signatures look identical, which in turn creates numerous
distance collisions between items. The situation improves with
Lp = 16, yet quite some ambiguity exists. With Lp = 24,
enough bits are in theory left in the clear to encode one
million signatures, but ambiguity is still observed in practice.
For all curves but the one where Lp = 32 (no encryption),
the gap between a pair of P-R curves shows the difference
in performance between the server (low performance) and the
client (high performance). We call it the “privacy gap”.
Thanks to much more accurate distance information, the
client always performs better than the server for a given
precision or recall. Due to its poor retrieval performance,
the server cannot properly identify items that are relevant to
the query, thus client privacy is protected. We observe that
the privacy gap increases with the encryption level. When
Lp = 16, it is interesting that the server’s curve is no longer
monotonic, contradicting the normal behavior of a retrieval
system. Typically the precision should decrease with the
number of results, because relevant items tend to concentrate
in the front of the candidate list. While in this case, more
relevant items are in the middle of the list due to the ambiguity,
so the precision slightly improves as the number of results
increases (see Fig. 4). This probably makes no sense in another
retrieval scenario, but it is indeed what we expect to achieve –
to confuse the server. When Lp = 8, the precision at the server
is close to 0 while the client performs quite well, thanks to
its profitable re-ranking. However, note that the performance
of the client also degrades with the strength of the encryption.
The trade-off between the enforcement of privacy (encryption)
and the quality of retrieval is well demonstrated here.
More detailed results are shown in Fig. 4-5, where the
precision and the recall are individually plotted for 200 best
ranked results (instead of 5, 000). The corresponding range is
also marked in Fig. 3 to facilitate correlation. They show that
the proposed mechanism can effectively reduce both precision
and recall for the server. In general, the privacy gap decreases
with the rank. Figure 6 plots the estimated probability that a
relevant candidate appears at a particular rank, knowing this
rank is below 200. With no or little encryption, i.e. large Lp,
correct answers are more likely to appear at top ranks. Thus
the plots have a high peak for top ranks. In contrast, when
encryption is strong (Lp = 8), correct answers are uniformly
distributed within the first 200 ranks. In this case, the server
is confused. It has small probability to identify the correct
answers, showing that privacy is enforced.
6.4.2 Search with Hash Table Look-up
We ran similar experiments when the server uses a hash-based
mechanism for indexing, which accelerates retrieval compared
with the linear scan used above. Hash-based indexing proceeds
as follows: the server splits the Lp bits of the outsourced
signatures in groups of l = 8 bits. Each group is used to build a
hash table. At search time, the server splits the query signature
in the same way, and builds Lt by merging the candidates in
the matching bucket(s) of the hash table(s). Then it parses the
list and returns all candidates to the client, i.e. L = Lt.
When signatures are not encrypted (Lp = 32), the server
uses 4 hash tables. With encryption, the server uses only 3,
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Fig. 7. Retrieval performance vs. encryption level (hash
table look-up). The privacy gap still exists.
2, or 1 hash table(s) corresponding to Lp set to 24, 16, or 8.
Which bits should be encrypted does not matter much as hash
values are almost equiprobable bits, as demonstrated in [2].
Figure 7 shows the P-R curves when using hash table look-
up. The privacy gap still exists with similar quality/privacy
trade-offs. Therefore, the privacy protection mechanism is
independent of the server’s internal retrieval method. However,
note that the recall is lower compared with the linear scan case,
as hash-based indexing might fail to identify correct answers
due to bucket allocation.
6.5 Experiments with Real Data
We conducted a second series of experiments to observe the
behavior of the framework when using signatures generated
from real images. Recall that the signatures outsourced to the
server are L = 128 bits long and that the database contains
5.3 million items. We start with the server running a linear
scan. Hash table look-up is discussed later.
6.5.1 Search with Linear Scan
The first experiment with real data shows the performance
when Lp = 128, 40, 32, 24, 16. The server is set to return the
top 0.5% items to the client. There is no encryption when Lp =
128, and this gives the baseline performance. Due to the size
of the database, severe ambiguity at the server is guaranteed
when Lp = 16. In practice, ambiguity is also likely for higher
values. The resulting pairs of P-R curves are shown in Fig. 8,
where the privacy gaps exist too. They are directly linked to
the value of Lp. The results here are consistent with the ones
in the synthetic data experiments, which proves the versatility
of the privacy enforcement framework. Compared with Fig. 3,
the results in Fig. 8 are better for both the server and the client,
because larger Lp values are used; for example, 24 clear bits
are sufficient to encode the 5.3 million signatures. Note that the
recall is much improved and gets close to one. That is because
near-duplicates tend to be close to their original counterpart
after robust hashing.
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6.5.2 Search with Hash Table Look-up
We ran similar experiments when the server uses a hash-
based mechanism for indexing. Here again the Lp bits of the
outsourced signatures are split into groups of 8 bits. When
Lp = 128, the server uses 16 hash tables. That number drops
to 5 when Lp = 40, and goes down to 2 when Lp = 16.
Figure 9 plots the P-R curves when Lp varies. As before, the
performance is controlled by the strength of encryption.
One important remark must be made. With hash-based
indexing, the value of Lp directly influences the number of
candidates in Lt, hence the contents of L that is returned to
the client. Hash-based indexing creates 28 buckets per hash
table, so each bucket contains roughly 5.3×106/28 ≈ 21, 000
items. When Lp = 16, two hash tables are created at the
server for indexing. Probing them at search time creates a
list Lt of about 42, 000 candidates. When Lp = 128, there
are 16 hash tables to probe, which results in about 336, 000
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Fig. 10. P-R curves with only top px candidates returned
to “client” (3 hash tables, Lp = 24). A trade-off between
retrieval performance and communication cost.
candidates in Lt. Figure 9 shows the performance when
L = Lt, i.e., all candidates found in the matching buckets
are returned to the client. Previous observations still hold, but
the gaps look smaller than in Fig. 8. This implies a trade-
off between privacy and indexing efficiency. Nevertheless,
returning many candidates to the client might cause too much
overhead (network, processing, . . . ). We therefore measured
the performance by varying the size of the list L. Figure 10
illustrates the impact of sending the top px candidates from
Lt, where px is set to 100%, 10%, 5%, 1%, and 0.5%.
This figure corresponds to Lp = 24. When px = 5%, the
server only sends about 6, 000 candidates to the client, but the
resulting performance is close to the original one, for which
about 63, 000 candidates are sent. Figure 11 shows a similar
experiment, but with Lp = 16. There are fewer hash tables and
thus fewer candidates compared with the previous case. The
performance difference at the client between different settings
becomes more noticeable. Selecting top 5% now only returns
less than 25% of relevant answers, which is worse than in the
previous case. Overall, this shows another trade-off between
retrieval performance and communication cost.
7 SECURITY AND PRIVACY ANALYSIS
The security and privacy provided by our proposal are compu-
tational. Without full encryption, the hash values do leak some
information. However, our framework can be acceptable, as
shown in the following.
7.1 Security analysis
Since standard encryption is used, predicting the encrypted
hash bits is computationally difficult for the server. On the
other hand, the unencrypted hash bits might reveal some
information about the original content. In the following, we
analyze the security threat from a reconstruction point of view.
We assume that the server’s goal is to reconstruct feature
vectors from their hash values. Given a feature vector f and
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Fig. 11. P-R curves with only top px candidates returned
to “client” (2 hash tables, Lp = 16). A trade-off between
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a random projection matrix P ∈ Rn×d, the hash values are
computed by
h = sign(P · f) . (14)
Assuming h ∈ {1,−1}n, when the hash length is not larger
than the feature dimensionality, i.e. n ≤ d, the reconstructed
feature vector can be represented as
fˆ = PT · h . (15)
Otherwise, the reconstruction is achieved by
fˆ = P † · h , (16)
where P † = (PTP )−1PT is the pseudo-inverse of P in a
least-square sense. In the following, we distinguish two cases
depending on the knowledge of P .
7.1.1 The projection P is known
When the server knows P , Eqn. (15) or (16) can be directly
used. However, the server is limited by two factors: 1) The
magnitude information is lost due to the sign operation in
Eqn. (14); 2) only partial hash bits are accessible. We evaluate
the quality of reconstruction by the correlation coefficient
between original and reconstructed feature vectors. The av-
erage results are shown in Fig. 12. They are obtained using
50 thousand GIST features and synthetic Gaussian data. We
notice that the reconstruction quality improves with the hash
length. There is no significant difference between synthetic
and real data. Since the server can typically access less than
32 bits per hash, at best its correlation coefficient is less than
0.2. That is a satisfactory result considering that privacy is
more about ambiguity rather than confidentiality.
7.1.2 The projection P is unknown
In this case, the server needs to find out the projection
matrix P first. The original P is a n × d random (typically
Gaussian) matrix, but the server only needs to know part of
it corresponding to the public hash length Lp (i.e. n = Lp),
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Fig. 12. Correlation coefficient between original and re-
constructed vectors.
denoted by P ′. The high entropy of P ′ can typically thwart
brute-force attacks. It is more feasible for the server to consider
known plaintext attacks or chosen plaintext attacks, which
require feature-hash pairs. According to [41], if hash values
are not binarized, the number of pairs required to find out P ′
is on the order of Lp. In practice, this is more difficult and no
existing work is found. In our scenario, if the owner and the
client do not reveal any feature data, it is difficult for the server
to obtain such pairs. Furthermore, the owner might regularly
update the encryption key to thwart plaintext attacks.
7.2 Privacy analysis
If a database of N items is indexed by L-bit hash values, on
average each hash bucket has N/2L items. If L ≥ log
2
N ,
the server is likely to find a unique match with the query.
When the available hash length is reduced to Lp, the number
of candidates in a hash bucket is approximately increased by
2Ls times, which implies that the privacy level is magnified
by 2Ls times. In order to maintain a constant privacy level, we
might require N/2Lp ≥ k, which can be linked to the notion
of k-anonymity [14].
The privacy gap gives an intuition about the server’s in-
capability in terms of retrieval performance. How does it
further influence privacy protection in a long run? In order
to gain more insights, we define the following scenario.
The feature vectors are partitioned into M clusters. Given a
query hash, the server’s goal is to find out which cluster the
query belongs to. In practice, the clusters can be compared
to categories of commercial products. A user profile can
be defined as a user’s preference over different categories.
Targeted recommendations are typically given according to
profiles. Thus the server’s capability in predicting a query’s
cluster is directly linked to long-term privacy. We assume that
the hash values of the M centroids are public. The server
can predict a query’s cluster by comparing the unencrypted
part of the query hash with the corresponding part of each
centroid hash. Figure 13 shows some experiment results with
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Fig. 14. Accuracy of query cluster prediction by hash
comparison without feature segmentation.
50 thousand GIST vectors (256-D after PCA). We set the
number of clusters M from 10 to 50. This number could be
larger in practice. However, prediction is easier for small M .
For the server, at best its accuracy is below 0.15, which is
sufficiently low to guarantee poor profiling accuracy. We also
show the client’s performance in the same figure. In fact, this
task is also difficult for the client, whose best accuracy is
below 0.3. This is due to the limited hash length and feature
segmentation (i.e. divide the feature vector into parts and
hash them separately). Figure 14 shows the prediction results
without feature segmentation. The accuracy is improved but
still poor for the server. We can conclude that hashing with
feature segmentation is “privacy friendly”, which blurs the
feature representation; partial encryption further prevents the
server from accurate profiling.
8 COMPARE WITH STATE-OF-THE-ART
In this section, we give an empirical comparison between our
proposal and SPEED approaches in terms of computation and
communication complexity. Although this comparison is not
exactly accurate due to several practical reasons, it suffices
to give an approximate idea about the difference. To the best
of our knowledge, no SPEED approach has been proposed
for outsourced media search – all existing SPEED approaches
assume a two party (client-server) scenario. Furthermore, they
do not offer any trade-off.
In general, SPEED approaches consist of three parts: fea-
ture transformation, distance computation, and match find-
ing. Existing approaches typically share some similarity in
the distance computation part. A typical distance metric is
the squared Euclidean distance. Denoting the feature dimen-
sionality by d, this metric roughly requires d squares, d
exponentiation operations, d − 1 multiplications, and one
public key encryption for each database item [10]. All these
operations work with large numbers represented by 1024 to
2048 bits. Hashing approaches, on the other hand, only require
d XOR operations for d-bit hash values. This explains why
SPEED approaches are generally slower than their hashing
counterparts. Some examples are given below.
We consider the privacy-preserving face recognition by
Erkin et. al [10] as a baseline. It is an eigenface-based
recognition system implemented by homomorphic encryption.
Their experiment involves 320 database records and 80 query
items. Specifically, each database item is represented by a 12-
dimensional feature vector. During a query, the query image
is first projected to 12 eigenface vectors; then the Euclidean
distance is computed between the query and each database
item, followed by ranking. It typically takes about 40 seconds
to compare a query with all database items. An average
accuracy of 96% can be achieved.
Our experiment with the same dataset shows that a similar
accuracy level can be achieved by a hash-based approach.
Specifically, each database item is represented by a 256-bit
hash value. During a query, the query image is first projected
to 128 eigenface vectors; then a 256-bit hash value is generated
by LSH; finally the Hamming distance is computed between
the query hash and each database item, followed by ranking.
We assume that the server sends all hash values of the
database to the client. It only takes about 0.3 ms to compare
a query with all database items. However, our simulation
does not include symmetric decryption. The speed of software
implemented symmetric encryption such as AES is about 100
MB per second in 2009.2 Taking decryption into account, our
solution take approximately 0.5 ms, which is still 80,000 times
faster than [10].
The time cost of [10] can be reduced to 18 seconds by
pre-computation. Sadeghi et. al [11] further improved the ef-
ficiency by replacing part of the protocol with garbled-circuit,
which results in 15.5 seconds. Osadchy et. al [12] proposed
a different secure face recognition algorithm based on facial
feature vocabularies. This algorithm exhibits better recognition
performance than the eigenface approach. However, it takes
2. http://www.cryptopp.com/benchmarks.html
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0.3 seconds to compare a query with a database item (i.e.
96 seconds for a database of 320 items). Note that these
large values do not include the time for offline preprocessing,
which can be even more significant. Recently, ˘Sede˘nka et.
al proposed another secure protocol for biometric compar-
ison [42]. They reported various time costs according to
different settings. Regardless of the recognition performance,
their protocol at best takes about 23 ms per comparison. Our
solution is still about 15,000 times faster.
Table 1 summarizes the comparison between the afore-
mentioned methods. We can observe a trade-off between
computation and communication among SPEED methods –
the faster, the more communication, and vice versa. Above all,
our solution is more efficient than others by several orders of
magnitude. Although it is a rough comparison, the significant
difference shows that our solution is a better choice for large-
scale applications, at least in the multimedia domain.
9 CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
Outsourced media search is a challenging three-party scenario,
where the privacy of the owner and the clients should be pro-
tected against an untrusted server. We address this scenario by
a privacy protection framework. The framework requires the
owner to hash its multimedia items and partially encrypt the
resulting hash values, which are then outsourced to the server.
At the client, multimedia items are also hashed and some
specific hash bits are used to form the queries to the server.
Hashing impedes the reconstruction of multimedia material by
its one-wayness, which prevents the server from learning about
the queries. On the other hand, encryption leaves only few bits
usable at the server, which lowers search precision, and makes
clustering-related tasks less accurate. Furthermore, encryption
precludes the server from relating queries with candidates.
At the client, the coarse results received from the server are
filtered. This is essentially a re-ranking process applied to
candidate signatures after decryption.
Extensive experiments show that partial encryption gen-
erally reduces the retrieval performance of the server, and
the performance drops faster when more bits are encrypted.
There is always a gap between the client’s and the server’s
performance. This “privacy gap” plays as the guard for privacy
and prevents user profiling by introducing uncertainties.
If search performance can be slightly sacrificed, the cost
for privacy can be further reduced. We consider reducing the
number of candidates by selecting the top matches at the
server. Results show that good performance can be maintained
with a small proportion of candidates. By tuning the number
of returned candidates, flexible trade-offs can be achieved
between privacy and communication cost.
Our proposal divides the search into two stages and requires
cooperation between the server and the client. This principle
generally applies to SRR approaches. The difference lies in
how the division is achieved. Our novel combination of hash-
ing and encryption enables flexible trade-offs among privacy,
retrieval performance, and complexity. In practice, the privacy
level is determined by the available information at the server
and the database size; the retrieval performance is mainly
determined by the available information at the client. When the
performance requirement changes or the database grows, the
hash lengths can be adjusted accordingly. Since the number of
representable items grows exponentially with the hash length,
our solution is suitable for large-scale applications.
In particular, our work does not presume whether owner
data is accessible to the client or not, because it works in
both cases. Nevertheless, for the more strict scenario (i.e.,
the database is totally confidential), the privacy guarantee is
somehow debatable and application-dependent, because of the
information leak. This might be interesting for future study.
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